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Abstract 
The question of weakening social cleavages and partisan ties within Western 
European electorates has received considerable attention. The dominant 
conclusion maintains that these long-term bonds have weakened, thus making for 
a ‘dealigned’ voter more responsive to short-term forces, coming from candidates 
or issues. However, the notion that such short-term forces are now more active has 
been little tested. In this paper, we focus on a short-term electoral force of abiding 
interest – the economic vote. We combine analyses of extended national election 
survey time series data for a half-dozen leading West European democracies with 
a macro-analysis of incumbents’ vote shares in Western Europe.  These data allow 
estimating theoretically compelling voting behavior models to examine the 
evolution of the economic vote. In line with previous research, we hypothesize 
that the electoral weight of the economic vote has increased over time, enabling 
voters to hold there governments ever more accountable. Our results, however, 
offer no indications of a growth of economic voting over time. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last couple of decades, voting behavior in advanced democracies appears to have 
changed strongly. The main causal mechanism referred to for explaining this alleged pattern 
of change is a process called ‘dealignment’, implying that over time the bonds between 
parties and voters are weakening (Crewe, Sarlvik, & Alt, 1977; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002). 
These changes serve as a challenge for fundamental theories of voting behavior. As a 
response, a number of leading scholars have concluded that a shift is taking place in which 
long-term vote choice determinants are becoming less important, while short-term 
determinants are increasingly important (Costa Lobo, 2006; Thomassen, 2005; Walczak, van 
der Brug, & de Vries, 2012). 
 
In the context of Western Europe, this process of change shows itself in the decaying impact 
of social characteristics and cleavages on vote choices (Franklin, Mackie, & Valen, 2009; 
Walczak et al., 2012). The impact of these changes is evident from the declining electoral 
strength of traditional cleavage parties across Western Europe (Best, 2011). Furthermore, a 
growing number of empirical studies offer indications that social cleavages are becoming less 
important predictors of citizens’ vote choices (Best, 2011; Evans & Tilley, 2012; Oddbjørn 
Knutsen, 2009; Nieuwbeerta, de Graaf, & Ultee, 2000; Nieuwbeerta & Ultee, 1999). In 
contrast to this wide scholarly attention for the decline of long-term factors, the related claim 
of a shift towards the short term has been little studied. 
 
A number of different short-term factors can be thought of as becoming increasingly 
important determinants of the vote choices of dealigned electorates (Costa Lobo, 2006; 
Walczak et al., 2012). In this paper, we focus on whether and how the effect of one major 
indicator varies temporally: the economy. To this end, we examine over-time changes in 
voting for the incumbent by means of micro- as well as macro-perspectives. In a first step, we 
present individual-level analyses of a collection of national election survey data from a half-
dozen countries across Western Europe. We analyze voting in Denmark (1987-2011), 
Germany (1976-2013), Great-Britain (1974-2010), the Netherlands (1986-2012), Norway 
(1985-2009) and Sweden (1985-2006). These nations are selected because of the quality and 
quantity of their election data, which make for stronger testing. As a result, our individual-
level analyses provide insights regarding changes in the economic vote from the 1970s to the 
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present. These analyses are supplemented with a rigorous analysis of a large time-series-
cross-sectional dataset of incumbent vote shares in Western European countries since 1950.  
 
In what follows, we first give an overview of the literature on changing voting behavior over 
time. In this section, we have special attention for expectations with regard to the impact of 
economic considerations on voting behavior. Next comes a presentation of the data and the 
methods used, which is followed by an overview of the results. In the results section, we first 
focus on the micro-level before moving to an aggregate-level analysis. We end with some 
concluding thoughts on the results and their implications. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Towards the short-term? 
 
The work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) has been highly influential for our understanding of 
what determines voting behavior in Western Europe. The validity of their assertion that 
cleavage structures dominate voting behavior was evident from the ‘frozenness’ of European 
party systems (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). While prominent, Lipset and Rokkan’s theory was 
soon contested. On the one hand, an increase of instability in voting behavior, coupled with 
rising levels of volatility, has challenged the contention of stability inherent in the work of 
Lipset and Rokkan (Crewe & Denver, 1985; Crewe et al., 1977; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002). 
On the other hand, there has been a fierce discussion on whether class cleavages are becoming 
less important predictors of electoral behavior. Clark and Lipset’s (1991) contention that 
social class was ‘dying’ as a determinant of electoral behavior  has sparked a debate about the 
presence and nature of this erosion (Evans & Tilley, 2012; Franklin et al., 2009; Jansen, de 
Graaf, & Need, 2011; Nieuwbeerta et al., 2000) or the continued relevance of classes in the 
vote choice process (Brooks, Nieuwbeerta, & Manza, 2006; van der Waal, Achterberg, & 
Houtman, 2007). A similar discussion is ongoing with respect to the alleged decline of 
religion on voting behavior in Western Europe (Botterman & Hooghe, 2012; Oddbjørn 
Knutsen, 2004; van der Brug, Hobolt, & de Vreese, 2009). 
 
The discussion on the extent to which the impact of cleavages and socio-structural 
determinants on voting behavior has waned continues, in largely a methodological vein 
(Jansen, Evans, & de Graaf, 2013; van der Waal et al., 2007). Overall, however, the 
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consensus now seems to be that – especially since the 1990s – the impact of cleavages on 
voting is indeed eroding (Evans & Tilley, 2012). In addition, partisanship has decreased over 
time (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002; Dalton, 2012) and the impact of ideology on electoral 
behavior as well is argued to be eroding (van der Brug, 2010; Walczak et al., 2012). In sum, a 
large and growing body of research indicates that the impact of structural factors and ideology 
on vote choices is waning. These observations lead to the question what has replaced for their 
impact on vote choices? A number of scholars have suggested that short-term factors should 
be looked at. As a consequence, short-term determinants such as issue positions, leaders, 
performance evaluations and the economy in general are all thought to become increasingly 
important vote choice determinants (Costa Lobo, 2006; Thomassen, 2005; Walczak et al., 
2012). 
 
While the supposed decline of structural factors on the vote choice has captured considerable 
research attention, the alleged increase of short-term factors has not. The answer to the 
question – what fills the gap that structural determinants have left? – however, is interesting 
on theoretical and normative grounds. If sociological predispositions no longer determine vote 
choices, that could lead to stronger mechanisms of accountability. Dealigned voters could 
independently assess how incumbents and parties have been performing and vote according to 
this judgment. If this were true, the process of dealignment could be “producing a 
deliberative public that more closely approximates the classic democratic ideal” (Dalton, 
McAllister, & Wattenberg, 2002: 60). 
 
2.2. Economic voting 
 
Research on the impact of economic conditions on voting behavior is large and still 
expanding (see for example the literature review in Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2007), or the 
current economic voting bibliography assembled by Stegmaier and Lewis-Beck (2013)). The 
classic assumption within this tradition – that can be traced back to the work of Key (1966) – 
is that voters hold incumbents accountable for past performances and punish or reward them 
accordingly. In the field of economic voting, the expectation is that incumbents are rewarded 
when the economy is doing well, but are punished by the voters when the economy is 
deteriorating. This economic voting paradigm was originally formulated within the context of 
the United States, but as studies on economic voting accumulated, it has become clear that the 
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mechanism is of importance in a wide set of electoral contexts (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 
2000, 2013). Moving beyond single-country studies furthermore, a number of recent 
publications on pooled data show that patterns of economic voting are indeed robust and 
consistently found across countries. This holds for the macro-level (Dassonneville & Lewis-
Beck, 2014a) as well as for the micro-level (Duch & Stevenson, 2006; Nadeau, Lewis-Beck, 
& Belanger, 2013).  As a result, by now we can safely state that the economic voter exists. 
Economic voting has been shown to be an important vote choice determinant in a large 
number of countries, and this observation holds both for elections decades ago as well as for 
recent elections (see for example the different collections by Bellucci, Costa Lobo and Lewis-
Beck (2012), Dassonneville and Lewis-Beck (2014b) and Escobar-Lemmon and Whitten 
(2011)). 
 
The evidence for the presence of an economic vote thus appears robust, but we still do not 
know whether the importance of the economy has grown stronger over time. An argument 
could indeed be made for the economic vote to increase as dealignment proceeds. After all, 
the term itself implies that the voter is now ‘freed’ from the distractions, or distortions, of 
social cleavages. Further, dealignment may be driven by a process of cognitive mobilization 
(Dalton, 1984, 2007). An increase of citizens’ level of education has armed voters to make 
their vote choices independently. Additionally, a media revolution has multiplied the number 
of sources that voters can rely on to obtain information on parties and politicians, their 
performance and their programs. Dealignment, consequently, can be considered a breeding 
ground for accountability to become important and for the economic vote to grow stronger 
over time.  
 
Previous research gives suggestive evidence for such a pattern. Kayser and Wlezien (2011), 
for example, convincingly show that the economic vote is stronger in countries with low 
partisan attachment than what holds in contexts with strong attachments. Furthermore, they 
offer an indication of the individual-level mechanism explaining this finding, as they show 
apartisans to be more responsive to the economic context. In a similar vein, Kosmidis and 
Xezonakis (2010) have shown that economic evaluations weigh more heavily on the vote 
choices of late deciders compared to what holds for voters who decided what party to vote 
fore before the start of the election campaign. Cross-sectional analyses thus indicate that the 
economic vote is stronger among the dealigned. The presence of a process of dealignment 
should therefore be associated with an increased weight of economic evaluations. This leads 
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Kayser and Wlezien (2011: 365) to assert that the implication of their findings is “a growing 
effect for the objective economy on the vote in Europe”. 
 
Even though it seems intuitive, the fact that partisanship is linked to the strength of the 
economic vote does not necessarily imply that the economic vote in Europe is indeed growing 
stronger over time. That first of all depends on the extent to which European electorates are 
becoming more dealigned. Additionally, dealignment is not the only process of change 
observed in Western Europe and other developments could act to counterbalance the impact 
of dealignment, such as for example the trend of economic globalization (Duch & Stevenson, 
2010; Fernández-Albertos, 2006; Hellwig & Samuels, 2007; Hellwig, 2001). Given these 
considerations, we argue that for any conclusions on the temporal dimension of the economic 
vote to be drawn, an analysis of actual over-time changes in the economic vote is warranted. 
Such studies are rare and the results of the limited number of studies investigating changes of 
the economic vote furthermore are not pointing in the same direction. Anderson (1995) claims 
that voters have become more sensitive to the economy when voting, but Listhaug’s (2005) 
analysis of retrospective voting in Europe since the 1970s does not offer indications for the 
claim that economic voting is on the rise in Western Europe. Furthermore, from their analyses 
of a wealth of survey data in advanced democracies between 1980 and 2000, Duch and 
Stevenson (2006, 2008) conclude that the magnitude of the economic vote is declining over 
time. Previous research, hence, is still inconclusive on whether and how the economic vote is 
changing over time. In the current paper, we aim to address this gap in the literature. To this 
end we investigate the temporal dimension of the economic vote in Western Europe. We 
examine this time dimension at a micro- as well as a macro-level, starting at the individual 
level, as this is where the alleged increase of the economic vote originates. 
 
3. DATA AND MEASURES 
 
3.1. Micro data 
 
For investigating the over-time trend in the economic vote at the individual level, we make 
use of data from representative election surveys in European countries that have extended 
time series. In contrast to previous research investigating the economic vote over a long time 
period (see for example Duch and Stevenson (2006) or Kayser and Wlezien (2011)), we only 
include election surveys in our dataset. Excluding other representative surveys, such as for 
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example Eurobarometer data, implies a reduction of the sample size. To obtain an accurate 
estimate of the economic vote, however, we are convinced that it is essential to rely on the 
reported vote in actual elections and not on measures of vote intention. Election studies are 
the ‘gold standard’ in the field of electoral research, they offer the best measures possible and 
hence the strongest test for our theories. Furthermore, we exclude surveys organized in the 
context of European Parliament elections. Even though such surveys have previously been 
analyzed to gain insights on the economic vote (Nadeau et al., 2013; van der Brug, van der 
Eijk, & Franklin, 2007), we focus on national elections only in the current paper, shedding 
light on the national economic vote.  
 
Given these restrictions, the starting base for our analyses are the data from The European 
Voter Project (ICORE, 2005). This dataset contains continuity files of election studies in 
Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, with a time frame 
from the late 1950s until the late 1990s. Economic measures, however, are only available 
from the mid-1970s onwards. As the British and Danish election surveys included in this 
dataset did not include our preferred measures of economic evaluations, national survey data 
for these countries come from the UK National Archive and the Centre for Survey and 
Survey/Register Data. 1  These data were subsequently complemented with survey data 
covering the most recent elections in each of the countries (for an overview of the data 
sources for all election surveys included in our analyses, see Appendix 1). Combining all 
these data sources, we can gain insights in the evaluation of the economic vote, at an 
individual level, from the mid 1970s until present. 
 
Analyzing the economic vote at an individual level in this set of six European democracies, 
we are examining vote choices in multiparty and proportional electoral systems. Such systems 
are different from the two-party systems where the tradition of economic voting originated. 
The nominal nature of party choice variables has pressed scholars investigating the economic 
vote in these contexts to use multinomial logit models (van der Brug et al., 2007) or to 
investigate voting for each party separately (Duch & Stevenson, 2006, 2008). To test 
economic voting theory in its purest form, however, a dependent variable capturing whether 
or not a respondent voted for an incumbent party can be justified, even though it is binary in 
                                                        
1
 The Danish National Election Study data are available for the period 1971-2011 
(http://www.valgprojektet.dk/default.asp). We are grateful to Rune Stubager for providing additional information 
and datasets for the Danish case.  
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nature. This approach has the additional advantage of comparability with the macro-analysis 
of the incumbent vote share (see below). Importantly, we decided not to take into account 
non-voters in our analysis, which is in line with how Duch and Stevenson (2006) have 
proceeded for their comparative analysis of the economic vote. 
 
As the focus of our paper is on over-time variation in the effect of economic evaluations on 
voting behavior, a crucial point is how economic evaluations are measured. Most importantly, 
in order to assess changes over time in the effect of the economy, we have to rely on 
indicators that are measured consistently. When combining the information of election survey 
data collected at different points in time and in different countries, however, some variation in 
question wording is inevitable. As a guiding principle therefore, we include survey data when 
they contain an economic evaluation measure of the preferred type. Building on a rich 
literature of economic voting at an individual-level, we prefer a measure of respondents’ 
retrospective and sociotropic evaluation of the economy (see also the discussion of measures 
in Duch and Stevenson, 2008).2 Sociotropic and retrospective items can be considered the 
standard measures in the economic voting literature, as they are most widely used, replicated 
and tested (Lewis-Beck, 1988; Stubager, Botterill, Lewis-Beck, & Nadeau, 2014). For reasons 
of comparability we have standardized all economic evaluation measures to run from 0 (most 
negative evaluation) to 1 (most positive evaluation). 
 
Our focus is on the impact of economic evaluations on voting in European democracies, but 
we can self-evidently not assess that effect without controlling for a set of relevant covariates. 
First, we control for a number of socio-demographic variables in each of the countries 
included. Besides gender and age, we also control for levels of education, religion3, social 
class or income and urbanization. What socio-structural covariates are included in the models 
is dependent on the availability of measures in the surveys and varies from country to country 
and sometimes from election to election as well. With the exception of age and gender, all 
socio-demographic measures were standardized to run from 0 to 1. The inclusion of these 
measures allows us to take into account the impact of cleavage structures on voting behavior, 
which is considered of foremost importance in the context of European democracies (Lipset 
& Rokkan, 1967). Second, we include a partisan ‘anchor variable’, which is respondents’ left-
                                                        
2
 The German data are an exception to this rule, as only a measure of the current state of the economy was 
included in German national election surveys.   
3
 Depending on availability, we include religious attendance, religiosity or religious denomination. 
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right placement (standardized to run from 0 to 1) in all countries except the British case, 
where we include partisanship (whether or not respondents identify with the incumbent 
party). 
 
3.2. Macro data 
 
In a second step, we investigate the over-time evolution of the economic vote at an aggregate 
level. To do so, we examine the link between the objective economy and incumbents’ 
performance in countries in Western Europe since 1950. The dataset used for these analyses 
cover 240 elections in 14 countries (see Appendix 2 an overview of the elections included).  
 
The dependent variable for the analyses at the macro-level is the incumbent vote share. For 
constructing this measure, electoral results as documented by Mackie and Rose (1991) were 
used. These were supplemented with information from election reports in Electoral Studies 
and the European Journal of Political Research and from online sources for the most recent 
elections (Nordsieck, 2015). Information on the incumbency status of parties comes from the 
‘Parliament and Government Composition Database’, which provides an overview of the 
cabinet composition in most OECD countries since 1945 (Döring & Manow, 2012). 
Incumbent vote shares were calculated by summing the vote shares of all parties that were 
part of the governing coalition before the elections. 
 
To examine the economic vote over time at an aggregate level, we rely on an objective 
indicator of the state of the economy. To this end, we make use of GDP growth rates, which 
Kayser and Wlezien (2011: 379) have labeled “the most general objective measure of 
economic welfare”. Furthermore, previous research has established a strong link between 
GDP growth rates and incumbent vote shares in Europe (Dassonneville & Lewis-Beck, 
2014a). Focusing on this economic indicator comes with the additional advantage that long 
time series of GDP growth rates are available for most OECD countries. We make use of the 
data from The Conference Board (2014), allowing us to go back to 1950. As is customary in 
research on economic voting, we incorporate a lag structure in our GDP measure and we use 
the conventional one year lead time (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2013). As time series of 
quarterly GDP growth rates are not available for the long time period covered by our 
analyses, we employ annual GDP growth rates. To take into account differences in the timing 
 10 
of particular elections, the data were weighted according to the election month – using the 
approach suggested by Bélanger and Gélineau (2010: 98).4 
 
Furthermore, our indicator of time is operationalized as time since 1950. Additionally, we 
control for the incumbent vote share in the previous elections and for two aspects of clarity of 
responsibility in the analyses. First, we include a measure of the effective number of parties in 
parliament, for which we use the Laakso-Taagepera (1979) index, as calculated and published 
by Gallagher (2015). Second, the number of parties in government is controlled for, using 
information available in the ParlGov dataset (2012).  
 
4. METHODS 
 
4.1. The micro-level 
 
In our individual-level analyses we examine voting for an incumbent party, which implies 
modeling a binary dependent variable (1 if a respondent voted for an incumbent party, 0 
otherwise). We hence estimate binary logistic regression models explaining this vote choice. 
Our interest is in the impact of economic evaluations on the probability to vote for the 
incumbent, controlling for the impact of socio-demographics and ideology. The models hence 
take the following form, with the inclusion of each of the control variables being dependent 
on their availability in a particular election study: 
 
ln (Vote for incumbent | Not vote for incumbent) =  α + β1 economy+    (1) 
β2 controls + ε   
 
With economy being voters’ retrospective sociotropic evaluation of the state of the 
economy in their country.        
 
A model of this form is estimated separately for each of the national election studies included. 
In order to assess the impact of the economy on the vote choice as well as its evolution over 
                                                        
4 We slightly modified their formula to ensure a one-year time lag for the economic indicators: ρ=[ρ(t-2) * (12-
σ(t))/12] + [ρ(t-1) * (σ(t)/12], where ρ is the annual economic indicator, σ is the election month and t is the election 
year. Data for GDP come from the Total Economy Database, providing comparative economic data for a wide 
set of countries from 1950 onwards. 
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time, we subsequently simulate quantities of interest, in this case the change in the probability 
of voting for the incumbent as respondents’ evaluation of the economy changes from the most 
negative to the most positive evaluation. This effect of economic evaluations is calculated 
while holding all other covariates in a specific model at their mean value and is based on 
1,000 simulated observations each time (King, Tomz, & Wittenberg, 2000). 
 
Besides such a country-by-country analysis of the evolution of the economic vote at an 
individual level, in a second step we pool all election surveys in a single dataset to examine 
the presence of a temporal trend in the impact of economic evaluations on voting for the 
incumbent. Given that the control variables included in the election specific models differ 
from country to country and from election to election, a direct pooling approach is not 
possible. To overcome this issue, for each election sample two separate models are estimated 
with only socio-demographic variables and only measures of ideology (left-right self-
placement or party id) respectively. The linear predictions, or yhats, of these models were 
subsequently saved and included in the pooled dataset. These serve as standardized measures 
to control for the impact of socio-demographics and ideology on the vote in our analyses. The 
other variables included in the pooled model are, besides the vote choice (1 = vote for an 
incumbent party, 0 = not vote for an incumbent party), respondents’ economic evaluation – 
which is standardized to run from 0 to 1 – and a measure of time since 1970. To examine the 
impact of economic evaluations on voting for the incumbent, and whether this impact has 
changed over time, a binary logit model of the following form is estimated on the pooled data: 
 
ln (Vote for incumbent | Not vote for incumbent) =  α + β1 economy + β2 time +  (2) 
β3 economy x time + β4 socio-demographic yhat + β5 ideology yhat + ε 
 
with economy being respondents’ retrospective sociotropic evaluation of the state of 
the economy in their country, time being the time elapsed since 1970. Socio-
demographic yhat is the linear prediction of an election-specific estimation of voting 
for the incumbent with only socio-demographics included as independent variables. 
Ideology yhat is the linear prediction of an election-specific estimation of voting for 
the incumbent with only left-right self-placement (or party id in the case of Great 
Britain) included as a predictor of voting for the incumbent. 
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4.2. The macro-level 
 
Our macro-dataset can be defined as a time-series-cross-section (TSCS), and this data 
structure has to be taken into account when modeling. Before analyzing the data, we verify 
whether they are stationary. Given that the panel is unbalanced, with more elections included 
for some countries than what holds for others, we have performed an Im-Pesaran-Shin and a 
Fisher unit root test, both confirming the stationary nature of the data.5 
 
In terms of the estimation, we follow the approach recommended by Beck and Katz and 
analyze the data by means of OLS regression, with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) 
specified (Beck & Katz, 1995; Beck, 2001). The model takes the following form: 
 
Incumbent vote share = α + β1 GDP + β2 time + β3 GDP x time + β4 controls + ε  (3) 
 
With GDP being the weighted GDP growth rate, one year before the election and time 
being the time since 1950. 
 
As evident from equation (3), this model includes an interaction between GDP and time, 
which allows examining whether the impact of the economy on incumbents’ electoral 
performance has changed significantly over time. 
 
While the model presented in equation (3) is our basic specification, we also verify whether 
results are robust when accounting for country-specific heterogeneity by means of the 
inclusion of country fixed effects and when accounting for serial correlation by means of the 
inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the 
model additionally serves as control for a potential omitted variable bias. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
5
 The p-values for the test statistics were < 0.001 for both tests. 
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5. RESULTS 
 
5.1. The micro-level 
 
5.1.1. Country-by-country analyses 
We start by investigating the temporal dimension of the economic vote at an individual level. 
To this end, we examine the impact of economic evaluations on voting for an incumbent party 
in national elections in Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden. Importantly, Kayser and Wlezien’s (2011) assumption that the economic vote is 
growing stronger over time is based on the assumption that partisanship is decreasing, 
‘liberating’ voters to punish and reward their incumbents. For the six countries under study, it 
is indeed often claimed that a process of dealignment is at work, as evident from decreasing 
levels of partisan attachment. An examination of levels of partisan attachment, as measured in 
Eurobarometer surveys, confirms that the partisan attachments of electorates in most of those 
countries are weakening over time (see Appendix 3).6 Surprisingly, this does not hold for the 
British case. 
 
We estimate a total of 44 logistic regressions explaining voting for one of the incumbent 
parties in each of these countries. Our interest is mainly in the effect of respondents’ 
retrospective evaluation of the national economy on choosing an incumbent party, but we 
additionally include a number of control variables in the vote choice models we estimate.  
 
The full results of these regressions are listed in Appendix 4. Reading through these election-
specific regression estimations, there clearly is considerable variation. The model fit statistics 
of the models indicate considerable over-time fluctuation in the explanatory power of the vote 
choice models, without strong indications of a decrease of how well model performs. In terms 
of socio-demographics and cleavage variables as well, there is strong variation in the extent to 
which – even within a single country – particular variables predict the vote choice. For these 
variables as well, no clear time trend can be observed, and it is noteworthy that some 
variables are consistently found to be strong predictors throughout the whole time series, as is 
the case with religion in the Dutch electoral context or social class in Sweden. For ideology, 
                                                        
6
 Unfortunately the Eurobarometer data (The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, 1970-2002 – ZA3521_v2-0-
1) does not contain information on partisanship in Sweden. 
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and partisanship in Great Britain, results indicate that these are consistently strong predictors 
of the vote choice in each of the elections covered. 
 
As holds for the other independent variables as well, there is quite some variation – from 
country to country and from one election to another – in the extent to which economic 
evaluations affect the vote choice. As a way to summarize the results and the evolution of the 
economic vote over time more specifically, we therefore present some simulated quantities of 
interest in Figure 1. We plot, for each of country in the sample separately, the change in the 
probability of voting for an incumbent party as a respondent moves from the most negative to 
the most positive evaluation of the state of the national economy. These predicted 
probabilities were obtained for each of the election studies separately, and are based on 1,000 
simulated observations each time. Just from eyeballing the graphs, it is safe to conclude that 
our country-specific analyses do not offer evidence for an increase of the economic vote over 
time. If any trend is to be discerned in the impact of economic evaluations on voting for the 
incumbent, it might be a slight decrease over time. Especially for the most recent elections, 
the estimated impact of economic evaluations tends to be rather low.7 
 
                                                        
7
 We would come to the same substantive conclusion if we simply examined the over-time evolution of the 
economic evaluation coefficient in each of the countries (see Appendix 5) instead of changes in predicted 
probabilities. 
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FIGURE 1. Effect of the economy on voting for the incumbent
 
Note: First difference (and 95%-confidence interval) of voting for the incumbent as economic evaluation moves 
from least to most positive, with all covariates set at their mean value. Based on 1,000 simulated observations for 
each of the models presented in Appendix 4. Calculated through Clarify command (King et al., 2000). 
 
5.1.2. Pooled analyses 
The country-by-country analyses do not offer indications of economic evaluations gaining 
weight over time and the graphical presentation of the estimated effects in Figure 1 even 
suggest a slight decrease of their importance. As a way to ascertain this observation, we 
subsequently pool the 44 elections surveys into a single dataset and examine the impact of 
economic evaluations on this data pool.  
 
The results of these analyses are presented in Table 1. In Model 1, we first evaluate whether, 
across the pool, economic evaluations significantly affect voting for an incumbent party. Our 
results confirm the presence of economic voting in our sample of six West European 
countries. Respondents’ economic evaluation, which we standardized to run from 0 to 1, has a 
coefficient of about 0.9 and easily reaches statistical significance (p<0.001). Interestingly, this 
coefficient is close to the estimate Nadeau et al. (2013) obtain when investigating the 
economic vote in a sample of European democracies (they estimate the effect of economic 
evaluations on voting for an incumbent party at 1.1). Our results not only indicate that 
economic evaluations significantly affect voting for the incumbent, they also imply a 
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substantial effect. As voters move from the most negative to the most positive evaluation of 
the state of the national economy, their probability to choose an incumbent party more than 
doubles (odds ratio = 2.34). Additionally, the fact that the socio-demographic and ideology 
yhats are both significantly related to voting for an incumbent party confirm the need to 
control for socio-demographic variables and ideology when explaining the vote in Western 
Europe. 
 
Having confirmed that voters in the six West European countries under study are economic 
voters, our attention is now drawn to investigating whether the impact of economic 
evaluations has changed over time. To this end, in Model 2 we add an interaction term 
between respondents’ economic evaluation and an indicator of time (measured as years since 
1970). As can be read from the results in Table 1, we do not find indications of an over-time 
change in the impact of economic evaluations on choosing an incumbent party. In line with 
the country-by-country analyses, a negative interaction effect between time and GDP growth 
rates is hinted at, but this interaction term does not reach a conventional level of statistical 
significance.  
 
In Model 3 and 4 we further examine whether this result is robust under different model 
specifications. Given that we are analyzing individuals’ vote choices in a large pool of 
election studies in six different countries, in Model 3 we additionally add country-fixed 
effects to the model and specify that standard errors should be robust for these country 
clusters. In Model 4, we go a step further and add a dummy variable for each election sample 
in the pooled data. Regardless of the exact model specification, our results do not offer any 
indication of an over-time evolution in the impact of economic evaluations on voting for an 
incumbent party in the countries under study.  
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TABLE 1. Explaining voting for the incumbent – individual-level binomial logit estimations 
(since 1974) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Economic evaluation (0-1) 0.859*** 
(0.032) 
0.977*** 
(0.098) 
1.126** 
(0.388) 
1.695*** 
(0.366) 
Time  0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.015* 
(0.006) 
-0.079*** 
(0.012) 
Economic evaluation x Time  -0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
Sociodemographics yhat 0.650*** 
(0.015) 
0.651*** 
(0.015) 
0.719*** 
(0.016) 
0.829*** 
(0.035) 
Left-right/partisanship yhat 0.917*** 
(0.009) 
0.916*** 
(0.009) 
0.924*** 
(0.023) 
0.948*** 
(0.014) 
Constant -0.436*** 
(0.036) 
-0.500*** 
(0.059) 
-0.633** 
(0.243) 
1.314*** 
(0.239) 
Country dummies included? No No Yes Yes 
Election dummies included? No No No Yes 
N 65,337 65,337 65,337 65,337 
pseudo-R2 0.301 0.301 0.304 0.312 
Correctly classified 77.58% 77.56% 77.73% 78.28% 
Note: Standard errors in Model 3 are robust for 6 country-clusters. Standard errors are robust for 44 election-
clusters in Model 4.  Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. 
 
In conclusion, our individual-level analyses confirm the presence of economic voting in 
Western Europe. With few exceptions we observe that, across countries and elections, 
economic evaluations are significant predictors of choosing an incumbent party. Our pooled 
analyses furthermore confirm the importance of economic evaluations. With respect to the 
temporal dimension of the economic vote, however, we offer null results. While the overall 
trend seems to be decreasing, there are no indications that the impact of economic evaluations 
is changing significantly over time.   
 
5.2. The macro-level 
 
Kayser and Wlezien (2011) have convincingly argued that, as a result of a process of 
dealignment, the economic vote should increase over time. Our individual-level analyses, 
however, offer no indications of such a pattern. Even though these micro-findings are strong 
and robust to different operationalizations, they still might be criticized. An important source 
of skepticism towards our findings could lie in the fact that they are based on respondents’ 
assessment of the economy and not on the impact of objective and therefore exogenous 
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economic indicators (Kramer, 1983). As a response to such concerns, we have investigated 
how well respondents’ evaluations of the state of the national economy correlate with an 
objective economic indicator. For the full individual-level dataset, we find that mean 
economic evaluations in a particular election correlate significantly but moderately with GDP 
growth rates in the year preceding the election (pearson correlation coefficient of 0.343, 
p<0.05). Furthermore, respondents’ reported vote as measured in election surveys correlates 
strongly to the actual vote share incumbents obtain (pearson correlation coefficient of 0.885, 
p<0.001). Nevertheless, skepticism might remain with respect to the validity of an individual-
level analysis. Therefore, in a next step, we examine whether at a macro-level, and when 
focusing on the impact of the objective economy on incumbents’ vote share as well, we would 
conclude that there are no indications of the economic vote growing stronger over time. 
 
Our macro-level dataset allows investigating the time trend of how the economy affects 
incumbents’ vote share since 1950, which is a larger time frame than our individual-level data 
allowed investigating. Before examining whether we can observe a pattern of change over 
time, however, at the macro-level as well we first confirm the presence of an economic vote 
in Western Europe. The results of Model 1 in Table 2 confirm that GDP growth rates are 
significantly related to the vote share incumbents obtain in democracies in Western Europe. 
The coefficient is about 0.9, implying that a one percentage increase in GDP growth results in 
a 0.9 percentage point increase in incumbent support. Furthermore, in terms of size and 
significance, this result is robust to controlling for country-specific heterogeneity in the 
dataset by including country fixed effects in the model (Model 3 in Table 2) and to controlling 
for an omitted variable bias by means of the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable (Model 
5 in Table 2). Interestingly, this estimated impact of GDP growth rates on incumbents’ 
electoral performance is even a bit larger than the effect found by Dassonneville and Lewis-
Beck (2014a) for a somewhat larger set of countries. For democracies in Western Europe, we 
can hence safely conclude that the state of the economy – as reflected in GDP growth rates – 
affects how incumbents fare on Election Day. 
 
Having confirmed that the economy affects incumbents’ vote share in Western Europe, in a 
next step we examine whether this link has changed over time. Has the economic vote 
strengthened over time, as Kayser and Wlezien (2011) have claimed? The presence of a 
temporal trend is examined by the inclusion of an interaction term between GDP growth rates 
and time (measured as years since 1950). If Kayser and Wlezien (2011) have it right, we 
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would find a positive and significant interaction term, implying that the impact of GDP 
growth rates on incumbents’ vote shares has increased over time. As evident from the 
estimates of Model 2 in Table 2, the interaction term is negative and is far from reaching a 
conventional level of statistical significance. The same holds when we additionally control for 
country-specific effects by means of the inclusion of country dummies (Model 4) or including 
a lagged dependent variable (Model 6). These results lead us to conclude that economic 
voting exists in Western Europe, but has not grown stronger or weakened over time.  
 
TABLE 2. Explaining the incumbent vote share in Western Europe (since 1950) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Incumbent vote 
sharee-1 
    0.859*** 
(0.039) 
0.859*** 
(0.039) 
GDP growth rate 0.917* 
(0.388) 
1.532* 
(0.699) 
0.939** 
(0.323) 
1.232 
(0.636) 
0.516** 
(0.169) 
0.547 
(0.302) 
Time  -0.111** 
(0.043) 
-0.052 
(0.066) 
-0.130*** 
(0.031) 
-0.103 
(0.057) 
-0.081*** 
(0.020) 
-0.078* 
(0.030) 
GDP growth x Time  -0.019 
(0.017) 
 -0.009 
(0.015) 
 -0.001 
(0.008) 
Constant 50.264*** 
(2.222) 
48.066*** 
(3.001) 
63.740*** 
(3.883) 
62.563*** 
(4.462) 
7.732* 
(3.026) 
7.622* 
(3.135) 
Country dummies? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N elections 240 240 240 240 240 240 
N countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 
R2 0.054 0.057 0.541 0.541 0.876 0.876 
Note: OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), estimated through xtpcse in Stata. 
Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. e-1 refers to the previous election. 
 
As evident from the results in Table 2, our macro-analyses indicate the presence of economic 
voting in Western Europe, but lead to us to reject the claim that the impact of the economy 
has strengthened over time. In Table 3 we verify whether these conclusions hold when 
additionally controlling for variables capturing the extent of clarity of responsibility for the 
economy (Anderson, 2000; Powell & Whitten, 1993). To this end, we replicate the models 
presented in Table 2 and additionally include a measure of the number of parties in 
government and a lagged measure of the effective number of parties in a political system. As 
clear from the results in Table 3, the results are robust to including those indicators. The GDP 
growth rate in a country is estimated to be significantly related to incumbents’ vote share – 
with a coefficient of about 0.9. There is, however no indication that this effect has been 
changing significantly since 1950. Furthermore, because the thesis of how clarity of 
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responsibility affects economic voting implies interactions, we additionally verified whether 
these results are robust to additionally including interaction terms between GDP and the 
effective number of parties and the number of parties in government. These results (see 
Appendix 6) indicate that our results withstand this test as well.  
 
TABLE 3. Explaining the incumbent vote share in Western Europe (since 1950) – robustness: 
control variables  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Incumbent vote 
sharee-1 
    0.849*** 
(0.043) 
0.850*** 
(0.043) 
GDP growth rate 0.953** 
(0.327) 
0.998 
(0.580) 
0.911** 
(0.291) 
0.911 
(0.559) 
0.449** 
(0.166) 
0.269 
(0.296) 
Time  -0.098* 
(0.040) 
-0.093 
(0.061) 
-0.134*** 
(0.033) 
-0.134* 
(0.055) 
-0.126*** 
(0.023) 
-0.145*** 
(0.034) 
GDP growth x Time  -0.001 
(0.015) 
 0.000 
(0.013) 
 0.006 
(0.007) 
ENEPe-1 -4.110*** 
(0.753) 
-4.111*** 
(0.753) 
-2.333*** 
(0.647) 
-2.333*** 
(0.652) 
1.249* 
(0.521) 
1.301* 
(0.527) 
# parties in 
government 
9.767*** 
(0.978) 
9.762*** 
(0.976) 
6.735*** 
(0.795) 
6.735*** 
(0.793) 
0.551 
(0.521) 
0.564 
(0.522) 
Constant 44.755*** 
(2.522) 
44.610*** 
(2.930) 
59.098*** 
(3.579) 
59.099*** 
(4.006) 
5.524 
(3.178) 
6.6066 
(3.222) 
Country dummies? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N elections 240 240 240 240 240 240 
N countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 
R2 0.396 0.396 0.655 0.655 0.884 0.884 
Note: OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), estimated through xtpcse in Stata. 
Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. e-1 refers to the previous election. 
 
6.  CHALLENGES 
 
In contrast to what Kayser and Wlezien (2011) have suggested, our results do not offer 
indications of a growing economic vote in Western Europe. Our individual-level analyses on 
six European democracies offer no indications of an increased importance of economic 
evaluations for explaining the vote. Furthermore, our macro-level analyses of incumbents’ 
vote share in a large pool of West European democracies do not hint at a growing economic 
vote either. Our aggregate-level analyses hence match our individual-level observations in 
showing the absence of a temporal dimension of economic voting in Western Europe. These 
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results are strong, but a number of challenges could still be raised against our findings. In 
what follows, we address such challenges, further verifying the robustness of our results. 
 
First, while the country-by-country analyses of the impact of economic evaluations on the 
vote suggested a slight decrease, the macro-analyses led us to refute any claims of the 
presence of a temporal dimension in economic voting in Western Europe. Importantly, the 
time frame of our micro- and macro-analyses differs. And it could be claimed that – if the 
trend in economic voting would be decreasing – this is a fairly recent evolution. If so, 
analyzing changes over too extended a time period could mask this more recent time trend. 
Therefore, as an additional robustness test, we investigate the economic vote when limiting 
the aggregate-level analyses to elections since 1974 – which corresponds to the time frame of 
our micro-analyses. As evident form the results in Table 4, the effect of GDP growth rates on 
incumbents’ vote share is still in expected directions in the main models (Model 1, 3 and 5), 
although the significance level drops. Without any doubt, this is due to the reduced sample 
size. Importantly, with respect to the temporal dimension of the economic vote, our 
conclusion holds for a test on this shorter time frame as well; there are no indications that the 
economic vote is changing significantly over time – confirming the results of our individual-
level analyses on a pooled dataset of election surveys. Additionally the same holds when 
further restricting the aggregate-level analysis to only those elections included in the micro-
analyses. Due to a further reduction of the sample size, the impact of GDP growth rates no 
longer reaches a conventional level of statistical significance, but the sign of GDP on 
incumbents’ vote share is still in expected directions in two of the main models. No 
indications of a temporal trend in the impact of GDP is hinted at, however (see Appendix 7). 
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TABLE 4. Explaining the incumbent vote share in Western Europe (since 1974) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Incumbent vote 
sharee-1 
    0.741*** 
(0.056) 
0.741*** 
(0.056) 
GDP growth rate 0.501 
(0.504) 
-1.470 
(1.681) 
0.781* 
(0.316) 
0.214 
(1.087) 
0.561* 
(0.234) 
-0.072 
(0.860) 
Time  -0.113 
(0.083) 
-0.215 
(0.131) 
-0.122** 
(0.042) 
-0.151* 
(0.065) 
-0.115** 
(0.033) 
-0.147** 
(0.050) 
GDP growth x Time  0.044 
(0.032) 
 0.012 
(0.023) 
 0.014 
(0.018) 
Constant 51.356*** 
(4.484) 
56.181*** 
(6.757) 
58.728*** 
(3.393) 
60.096*** 
(4.093) 
15.200*** 
(3.633) 
16.706*** 
(4.317) 
Country dummies? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N elections 154 154 154 154 154 154 
N countries 14 14 14 14 14 14 
R2 0.020 0.029 0.659 0.659 0.843 0.843 
Note: OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), estimated through xtpcse in Stata. 
Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. e-1 refers to the previous election. 
 
Second, our pooled analyses of 44 national election surveys did not offer indications of a 
temporal trend in the importance of economic evaluations for predicting the vote. The 
country-by-country analyses revealed however that in four of the six countries under study – 
Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden – the impact of economic evaluations is 
not significant in the most recent election in the time series. Additionally, even though the 
effect of economic evaluations is still significant in the Danish 2011 election, its effect is only 
half the size of what holds for the other elections examined. Is this an indication of an erosion 
of economic voting? We argue that another issue might be causing the reduction of the 
estimated impact of the economic vote in these elections: a restricted variance problem in 
times of economic crisis. If so, the decline of the economic vote in the most recent elections 
should not be interpreted as an indication of a more general decreasing trend, but as a 
consequence of a measurement problem in times of crisis. We hence further investigate this 
possibility.  
 
We look at some descriptive statistics of individuals’ evaluation of the state of the national 
economy. Figure 2 graphically presents respondents’ mean evaluation of the economy 
(standardized to run from 0 to 1 in all samples) for each of the election samples. These 
descriptives indicate that economic evaluations were indeed at their lowest level in the most 
recent elections in the case of Denmark, Great Britain and the Netherlands. For Sweden, the 
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lowest mean evaluation of the state of the economy is found in 1994, an election for which we 
estimated economic evaluations not to be affecting voting for the incumbent (see Appendix 
4). Clearly, there are some indications that the variance in economic evaluations is indeed 
more restricted in times of crisis. This methodological issue could be causing the somewhat 
lower economic voting estimates in the most recent elections. If so, we are underestimating 
the extent to which the economy affected vote choices in those recent elections – which 
would make for even more stability than our analyses hint at.  
 
FIGURE 2. Mean economic evaluation in individual-level election surveys 
 
Note: Mean economic evaluations (sociotropic and retrospective) and 95%-confidence intervals in national 
election surveys.  
 
 
7. DISCUSSION 
 
We started this paper from the assumption that voting behavior is changing over time. More 
specifically, in line with previous research, we expected to observe a shift from the long-term 
towards short-term determinants of the vote. Our analyses of what explains the vote choice, in 
terms of incumbent support, in six West European democracies are not in line with this 
expectation. Across several decades, we observe that the model fit statistics are fluctuating 
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strongly, with numbers rising or falling suddenly over time. Estimating a basic model of the 
vote in elections over an extended time period does not hint at models performing worse over 
time. In sum, it appears that the laws of democratic political behavior, such as they are, still 
work in the same way. 
 
With respect to economic voting more specifically, we find strong evidence of economic 
voting. Economic evaluations are important predictors of whether or not voters choose an 
incumbent party and incumbents’ vote share is dependent on objective economic conditions, 
such as economic growth. Voters in Western Europe are found to be economic voters.   
 
As for the temporal trend, in line with previous research we assumed the process of 
dealignment to have led to an over-time increase of the economic vote.  Our results, however, 
lead us to refute claims of economic voting being strengthened. First, our individual-level 
analyses on six Western European democracies are not showing an increase of the impact of 
economic evaluations on the vote. If a trend is to be discerned in our estimates, it is a 
decreasing one with especially the most recent crisis elections featuring weak effects. Overall, 
however, it is safe to conclude that there is simply no change in the economic vote. We argue 
so, first because this slight drop in the effect could be attributable to a restriction in variance 
of economic attitudes recently brought by the Great Recession. Second, and more 
importantly, our analysis on the pooled individual-level data shows the absence of any time 
trend in the strength of economic evaluations. These null results at the micro-level receive 
further confirmation when analyzing aggregate-level data. While economic growth affects 
how incumbents fare in elections in Western Europe, there are no indications of this impact 
having grown stronger since the 1950s. Our results furthermore are robust to using different 
estimation techniques, to adding a number of controls or to some additional tests. 
Consequently, we can confidently conclude from our results that the economic vote has not 
increased over time.  
 
Economic voting effects are stable over time, despite the apparent opportunity for economic 
voting afforded by the social and political dealignment occurring across the electorates of the 
region. Perhaps the impact of dealignment on economic voting is counterbalanced by other 
processes of change, and the trend towards economic globalization seems a likely candidate to 
have done so. Without evidence of a temporal trend in economic voting, it should be 
investigated why the process of dealignment has not led to a growth of the economic vote. 
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APPENDIX 1. Elections included in the analyses (micro-level) 
Country Election Data source Question wording economic 
evaluation 
Incumbent parties8 
Denmark 1987 Provided by Rune Stubager [DDA87_88 file]  KF, V, CD, KRF 
Denmark 1990 Provided by Rune Stubager [DDA90 file]  KF, V, RV 
Denmark 1994 Centre for Survey and Survey/Register Data 
(http://www.surveybanken.aau.dk) 
 
How would you assess the economic 
situation of Denmark today, compared to 
the situation one year ago? 
-Much better 
-Somewhat better 
-No change 
-Somewhat worse 
-Much worse 
SD, CD, RV, KRF 
Denmark 1998 Centre for Survey and Survey/Register Data 
(http://www.surveybanken.aau.dk) 
 
How would you assess the economic 
situation of Denmark today, compared to 
the situation one year ago? 
-Much better 
-Somewhat better 
-No change 
-Somewhat worse 
-Much worse 
SD, RV 
Denmark 2001 Centre for Survey and Survey/Register Data 
(http://www.surveybanken.aau.dk) 
 
How would you assess the economic 
situation of Denmark today, compared to 
the situation one year ago? 
-Much better 
-Somewhat better 
-No change 
-Somewhat worse 
-Much worse 
SD, RV 
Denmark 2005 Centre for Survey and Survey/Register Data 
(http://www.surveybanken.aau.dk) 
How would you assess the economic 
situation of Denmark today, compared to 
V, KF 
                                                        
8
 Information on what parties are to be considered incumbents comes from the ParlGov Database (Döring, Holger and Philip Manow. 2012. Parliament and 
government composition database (ParlGov): An infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies. 
Version 12/10 – 15 October 2012). 
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 the situation one year ago? 
-Much better 
-Somewhat better 
-No change 
-Somewhat worse 
-Much worse 
Denmark 2007 Centre for Survey and Survey/Register Data 
(http://www.surveybanken.aau.dk) 
 
How would you assess the economic 
situation of Denmark today, compared to 
the situation one year ago? 
-Much better 
-Somewhat better 
-No change 
-Somewhat worse 
-Much worse 
V, KF 
Denmark 2011 Centre for Survey and Survey/Register Data 
(http://www.surveybanken.aau.dk) 
 
How would you assess the economic 
situation of Denmark today, compared to 
the situation one year ago? 
-Much better 
-Somewhat better 
-No change 
-Somewhat worse 
-Much worse 
V, KF 
Germany  1976 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
What is your general assessment of the 
current economic situation in Germany? 
-Very good 
-Good 
-Neither good, neither bad 
-Bad 
-Very bad 
SPD, FDP 
Germany  1983 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
What is your general assessment of the 
current economic situation in Germany? 
-Very good 
-Good 
-Neither good, neither bad 
-Bad 
CDU, CSU, FDP 
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-Very bad 
Germany  1987 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
What is your general assessment of the 
current economic situation in Germany? 
-Very good 
-Good 
-Neither good, neither bad 
-Bad 
-Very bad 
CDU, CSU, FDP 
Germany  1990 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
What is your general assessment of the 
current economic situation in Germany? 
-Very good 
-Good 
-Neither good, neither bad 
-Bad 
-Very bad 
CDU, CSU, FDP 
Germany  1994 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
What is your general assessment of the 
current economic situation in Germany? 
-Very good 
-Good 
-Neither good, neither bad 
-Bad 
-Very bad 
CDU, CSU, FDP 
Germany  1998 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
What is your general assessment of the 
current economic situation in Germany? 
-Very good 
-Good 
-Neither good, neither bad 
-Bad 
-Very bad 
CDU, CSU, FDP 
Germany  2013 German Longitudinal Election Study 2013 
(Gesis Study Number ZA5700, v 1.0.0.) 
What is your general assessment of the 
current economic situation in Germany? 
-Very good 
-Good 
-Neither good, neither bad 
-Bad 
CDU, CSU, FDP 
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-Very bad 
Great Britain 1974 october British Election Study 1974 october (UK 
Data Archive) 
Looking back over the last 6 months, 
would you say that the state of Britain’s 
econmy has stayed about the same, got 
better, or got worse? 
LAB 
Great Britain 1987 British Election Study 1987 (UK Data 
Archive) 
[National economy last 12 months] 
-Got a lot better 
-Got a little better 
-Stayed the same 
-Got a little worse 
-Got a lot worse 
CON 
Great Britian 1992 British Election Study 1992 (UK Data 
Archive) 
Looking back over the last year or so, 
would you say that Britain’s economy 
has… 
-Got stronger 
-Got weaker 
-Or, stayed about the same 
CON 
Great Britain 1997 British Election Study 1997 (UK Data 
Archive) 
And how do you think the general 
economic situation in Britain has 
changed over the last 12 months? Has it 
-Got a lot better 
-Got a little better 
-Stayed the same 
-Got a little worse 
-Got a lot worse 
CON 
Great Britain 2001 British Election Study 2001 (UK Data 
Archive) 
How do you think the general economic 
situation in this country has changed 
over the last 12 months. Has it… 
-Got a lot worse 
-Got a little worse 
-Stayed the same 
-Got a little better 
-Got a lot better 
LAB 
Great Britain  2005 British Election Study 2005 (UK Data 
Archive) 
How do you think the general economic 
situation in this country has changed 
LAB 
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over the last 12 months.  
-Got a lot worse 
-Got a little worse 
-Stayed the same 
-Got a little better 
-Got a lot better 
Great Britain  2010 British Election Study 2010 (UK Data 
Archive) 
How do you think the general economic 
situation in this country has changed 
over the last 12 months. Has it: 
-Got a lot worse 
-Got a little worse 
-Stayed the same 
-Got a little better 
-Got a lot better 
LAB 
The Netherlands  1986 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
I would now like to ask you a few 
questions about what you think of the 
policies the government has conducted 
during the past four years (…). Do you 
think that the economic situation has 
been influenced favorably, unfavorably 
or neither by the government policies? 
CDA, VVD 
The Netherlands  1989 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
I would now like to ask you a few 
questions about what you think of the 
policies the government has conducted 
during the past four years (…). Do you 
think that the economic situation has 
been influenced favorably, unfavorably 
or neither by the government policies? 
CDA, VVD 
The Netherlands  1994 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
I would now like to ask you a few 
questions about what you think of the 
policies the government has conducted 
during the past four years (…). Do you 
think that the economic situation has 
been influenced favorably, unfavorably 
or neither by the government policies? 
CDA, PVDA 
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The Netherlands  1998 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
I would now like to ask you a few 
questions about what you think of the 
policies the government has conducted 
during the past four years (…). Do you 
think that the economic situation has 
been influenced favorably, unfavorably 
or neither by the government policies? 
PVDA, VVD, D66 
The Netherlands  2002 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 
2002/2003 (www.dpes.nl) 
 
I would now like to ask you a few 
questions about what you think of the 
policies the government has conducted 
during the past four years (…). Do you 
think that the economic situation has 
been influenced favorably, unfavorably 
or neither by the government policies? 
PVDA, VVD, D66 
The Netherlands  2006 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2006 
(www.dpes.nl) 
 
I would now like to ask you a few 
questions about what you think of the 
policies the government has conducted 
during the past four years (…). Do you 
think that the economic situation has 
been influenced favorably, unfavorably 
or neither by the government policies? 
CDA, VVD, D66 
The Netherlands  2010 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2010 
(www.dpes.nl) 
 
I would now like to ask you a few 
questions about what you think of the 
policies the government has conducted 
during the past four years (…). Do you 
think that the economic situation has 
been influenced favorably, unfavorably 
or neither by the government policies? 
CDA, PVDA, CU 
The Netherlands 2012 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study 2012 
(https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/datasets/id/easy-
dataset:57353/tab/2) 
 
Would you say that over the past twelve 
months, the Dutch economy’s condition 
has gotten better, stayed about the same 
or gotten worse? 
-- Much better or slightly better? 
-- Much worse or somewhat worse? 
VVD, CDA 
Norway 1985 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study Would you say that the economic H, KRF, SP 
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Number ZA3911) situation in the country has improved the 
last 12 months, is it almost unchanged or 
is it worse today? 
-- Would you say much better or a bit 
better 
-- Would you say much worse or a bit 
worse 
Norway 1989 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
Would you say that the economic 
situation in the country has improved the 
last 12 months, is it almost unchanged or 
is it worse today? 
-- Would you say much better or a bit 
better 
-- Would you say much worse or a bit 
worse 
DNA 
Norway 1993 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
Would you say that the economic 
situation in the country has improved the 
last 12 months, is it almost unchanged or 
is it worse today? 
-- Would you say much better or a bit 
better 
-- Would you say much worse or a bit 
worse 
DNA 
Norway 1997 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
Would you say that the economic 
situation in the country has improved the 
last 12 months, is it almost unchanged or 
is it worse today? 
-- Would you say much better or a bit 
better 
-- Would you say much worse or a bit 
worse 
DNA 
Norway 2001 Norwegian Election survey 2001 (Norwegian 
Socal Science Data Service – NSD) 
Would you say that the economic 
situation in the country has improved the 
last 12 months, is it almost unchanged or 
is it worse today? 
DNA 
 37 
-- Would you say much better or a bit 
better 
-- Would you say much worse or a bit 
worse 
Norway 2005 Norwegian Election survey 2005 (Norwegian 
Socal Science Data Service – NSD) 
Would you say that the economic 
situation in the country has improved the 
last 12 months, is it almost unchanged or 
is it worse today? 
-- Would you say much better or a bit 
better 
-- Would you say much worse or a bit 
worse 
KRF, H, V 
Norway 2009 Norwegian Election survey 2009 (Norwegian 
Socal Science Data Service – NSD) 
Would you say that the economic 
situation in the country has improved the 
last 12 months, is it almost unchanged or 
is it worse today? 
-- Would you say much better or a bit 
better 
-- Would you say much worse or a bit 
worse 
DNA, SV, SP 
Sweden 1985 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
How has, in your opinion, the Swedish 
economy changed in the last two or three 
years? Has it improved, remained about 
the same or has it got worse? 
SAP 
Sweden 1988 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
How has, in your opinion, the Swedish 
economy changed in the last two or three 
years? Has it improved, remained about 
the same or has it got worse? 
SAP 
Sweden 1991 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
How has, in your opinion, the Swedish 
economy changed in the last two or three 
years? Has it improved, remained about 
the same or has it got worse? 
SAP 
Sweden 1994 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
How has, in your opinion, the Swedish 
economy changed in the last two or three 
years? Has it improved, remained about 
MSP, FP, C, KS 
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the same or has it got worse? 
Sweden 1998 The European Voter dataset (Gesis Study 
Number ZA3911) 
How has, in your opinion, the Swedish 
economy changed in the last 12 months? 
Has it improved, remained about the 
same or has it got worse? 
SAP 
Sweden 2002 Swedish Election Study 2002 (SND 0812) Would you say that the economic 
situation in Sweden has improved, 
remained the same or gone worse during 
the last 12 months? 
SAP 
Sweden 2006 Swedish Election Study 2006 (SND 0861) Would you say that the economic 
situation in Sweden has improved, 
remained the same or gone worse during 
the last 12 months? 
SAP 
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APPENDIX 2. Elections included in the analysis (macro-level) 
Country Time frame Number of elections 
Austria 1953-2013 19 
Belgium 1954-2014 19 
Denmark 1953-2011 23 
Finland 1954-2011 16 
France 1956-2012 15 
Iceland 1953-2013 19 
Ireland 1954-2011 17 
Luxembourg 1954-2013 13 
The Netherlands 1956-2012 18 
Norway 1953-2013 16 
Sweden 1956-2014 19 
Switzerland 1955-2011 15 
United Kingdom 1955-2010 15 
(West) Germany 1953-2013 16 
TOTAL  240 
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APPENDIX 3. Trends in partisan attachment in Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, The Netherlands and Norway (Eurobarometer trendfile) 
 
Note: Mean levels of partisan attachment (on 1 to 4-scale, with 1 = no attachment, 2 = merely a sympathizer, 3 = fairly strong, 4 = very strong) in Eurobarometer surveys. 
Linear trend line added (dashed). Source: The Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File, 1979-2002, v2-0-1. [Dataset]. Cologne: Gesis.
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APPENDIX 4. Explaining voting for the incumbent in Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (full results) 
 
 
TABLE 1. Voting for the incumbent in Denmark (1987-2011) 
 
 1987 1990 1994 1998 2001 2005 2007 2011 
 b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Female 0.449* 
(0.188) 
0.357 
(0.222) 
0.187 
(0.123) 
-0.094 
(0.128) 
0.277* 
(0.121) 
0.267* 
(0.132) 
-0.076 
(0.089) 
0.036 
(0.138) 
Age 0.021** 
(0.006) 
0.105** a 
(0.034) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
Education (0-1) 0.282 
(0.315) 
1.495*** 
(0.361) 
-0.892*** 
(0.205) 
-1.103*** 
(0.206) 
-0.701*** 
(0.203) 
0.298 
(0.214) 
0.187 
(0.126) 
0.334 
(0.224) 
Income (0-1)  0.646 
(0.503) 
-0.799* 
(0.344) 
-0.016 
(0.394) 
-0.066 
(0.284) 
1.818*** 
(0.308) 
1.425*** 
(0.197) 
0.580 
(0.309) 
Urbanization (0-1)  0.663 
(0.357) 
-0.188 
(0.198) 
-0.022 
(0.075) 
0.051 
(0.179) 
-0.208 
(0.184) 
-0.529*** 
(0.130) 
-0.474* 
(0.213) 
Left right (0-1) 0.859*** 
(0.078) 
7.431*** 
(0.645) 
-3.240*** 
(0.296) 
-3.799*** 
(0.308) 
-4.113*** 
(0.296) 
6.725*** 
(0.363) 
4.830*** 
(0.198) 
5.572*** 
(0.340) 
Economy (0-1) 2.294*** 
(0.366) 
2.542*** 
(0.565) 
2.643*** 
(0.324) 
2.404*** 
(0.346) 
1.370*** 
(0.311) 
2.511*** 
(0.355) 
2.072*** 
(0.231) 
0.973*** 
(0.337) 
Constant -7.091*** 
(0.597) 
-9.055*** 
(0.808) 
0.472 
(0.387) 
0.917* 
(0.405) 
0.709 
(0.382) 
-7.061*** 
(0.459) 
-5.492*** 
(0.298) 
-4.878*** 
(0.397) 
N 787 668 1,466 1,481 1,648 1,774 3,435 1,589 
pseudo R2 0.305 0.372 0.157 0.154 0.143 0.314 0.266 0.235 
Correctly classified 79.67% 83.23% 69.58% 67.93% 67.84% 78.69% 77.90% 75.90% 
Area under the ROC curve 0.869 0.890 0.759 0.767 0.769 0.861 0.835 0.825 
Source: Danish election surveys 1994-2011, obtained from www.surveybank.dk. 1987 and 1990 election surveys obtained from Rune Stubager. Standard errors in 
parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. a Age measured in age categories. 
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TABLE 2. Voting for the incumbent in Germany (1976-2013) 
 1976 1983 1987 1990 1994 1998 2013 
 b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Female 0.203 -0.281 0.098 -0.103 -0.092 0.316* 0.281* 
 (0.197) (0.169) (0.167) (0.184) (0.182) (0.152) (0.135) 
Age -0.004 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.012* 0.009* 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Education (0-1) -0.901** 0.379 0.773** 0.424 -0.054 0.342 -0.061 
 (0.309) (0.271) (0.263) (0.248) (0.273) (0.198) (0.292) 
Religious attendance (0-1) -2.124*** 1.209*** 1.438*** 1.648*** 1.036** 1.534*** 1.520*** 
 (0.321) (0.272) (0.281) (0.286) (0.320) (0.253) (0.304) 
Professional status (0-1) -0.112 0.265 0.807** 0.214 -0.245 0.571  
 (0.352) (0.283) (0.289) (0.283) (0.319) (0.295)  
Social class (0-1) 0.393 -0.362 -0.234 0.176 -0.368 -0.265 0.562 
 (0.276) (0.275) (0.261) (0.278) (0.281) (0.243) (0.422) 
Urbanization (0-1) 0.203 -0.281 0.098 -0.103 -0.092 0.316* -0.070 
 (0.197) (0.169) (0.167) (0.184) (0.182) (0.152) (0.192) 
East-Germany     1.234*** -0.011 0.856*** 
     (0.215) (0.172) (0.163) 
Left right (0-1) -9.708*** 6.479*** 7.181*** 5.805*** 8.598*** 3.920*** 7.057*** 
 (0.747) (0.515) (0.496) (0.535) (0.669) (0.404) (0.474) 
Economy (0-1) 6.211*** 1.599** 4.600*** 0.429 2.501*** 1.456*** 1.873*** 
 (0.696) (0.498) (0.558) (0.389) (0.579) (0.371) (0.403) 
Constant 2.680*** -4.647*** -8.090*** -4.357*** -6.051*** -4.820*** -6.249*** 
 (0.613) (0.502) (0.576) (0.543) (0.598) (0.470) (0.505) 
N 956 882 1,113 743 853 976 1325 
pseudo R2 0.494 0.278 0.399 0.237 0.338 0.160 0.241 
Correctly classified 85.15% 77.55% 81.58% 75.24% 79.13% 71.82% 76.15% 
Area under the ROC curve 0.925 0.839 0.893 0.821 0.869 0.763 0.826 
Source: 1976-1998: The European Voter Dataset; 2013: GLES 2013. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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TABLE 3. Voting for the incumbent in Great Britain (1974-2010) – Vote for incumbent 
 1974 oct 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
 b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Female -0.110 0.152 0.277 0.553** 0.040 0.229* 0.031 
 (0.188) (0.147) (0.162) (0.201) (0.127) (0.097) (0.166) 
Age -0.018** 0.085*** a 0.016** 0.012 0.025*** 0.003 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.020) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
Religious denomination     0.042 0.140  
     (0.133) (0.102)  
Religious attendance (0-1)   -0.356 0.008   1.168** 
   (0.212) (0.267)   (0.370) 
Religiosity (0-1) -0.279       
 (0.284)       
Social class (0-1)  0.785** 0.865*** -0.013 -0.260 -0.340** -0.325 
  (0.294) (0.189) (0.243) (0.142) (0.109)  
Income (0-1) -0.988*  1.402*** 0.505 0.364 -0.024  
 (0.390)  (0.296) (0.360) (0.233) (0.178) (0.185) 
Incumbent party ID 4.790*** 3.188*** 4.770*** 5.253*** 3.242*** 1.567*** 3.217*** 
 (0.192) (0.145) (0.162) (0.215) (0.146) (0.117) (0.178) 
Economy (0-1) 1.103*** 4.069*** 1.202*** 2.051*** 1.550*** 1.814*** -0.046 
 (0.289) (0.339) (0.229) (0.438) (0.287) (0.213) (0.310) 
Constant -1.209** -5.631*** -4.951*** -5.969*** -4.563*** -2.114*** -2.666*** 
 (0.381) (0.330) (0.375) (0.534) (0.356) (0.236) (0.372) 
N 1,605 2,084 2,379 2,103 1,981 2,476 1,279 
pseudo R2 0.599 0.515 0.635 0.662 0.373 0.107 0.341 
Correctly classified 91.78% 87.43% 92.43% 93.91% 81.63% 74.64% 83.42% 
Area under the ROC curve 0.935 0.932 0.952 0.956 0.876 0.712 0.859 
Source: British election studies, UK Data archive. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. a Age categories. 
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TABLE 4. Voting for the incumbent in The Netherlands (1986-2010) – Vote for incumbent 
 1986 1989 1994 1998 2002 2006 2010 2012 
 b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Female 0.093 0.295* -0.064 0.256* 0.126 -0.029 0.033 0.005 
 (0.170) (0.147) (0.129) (0.124) (0.121) (0.118) (0.116) (0.136) 
Age 0.003  0.030*** -0.006 0.008 0.012** 0.012*** 0.014*** 
 (0.005)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Education (0-1) -0.642* -0.215 0.448** 0.310 0.598* 0.353 -0.490* 0.486 
 (0.252) (0.192) (0.165) (0.176) (0.250) (0.237) (0.228) (0.269) 
Religious attendance (0-1) 0.375 0.178 0.835*** -2.726*** -2.168*** -0.584** 2.378*** -0.126 
 (0.227) (0.194) (0.190) (0.186) (0.220) (0.185) (0.196) (0.208) 
Social class (0-1) 1.475*** 1.642*** -1.129*** 0.088 0.431 1.402*** -0.359 1.526*** 
 (0.342) (0.305) (0.263) (0.273) (0.287) (0.274) (0.263) (0.322) 
Urbanization (0-1) 0.129 -0.229 -0.558** -0.270 -0.250 -0.571** -0.180 -0.494* 
 (0.249) (0.210) (0.191) (0.191) (0.185) (0.191) (0.179) (0.219) 
Left right (0-1) 5.754*** 5.552*** -1.519*** 0.890** -0.584* 6.728*** -2.331*** 5.683*** 
 (0.441) (0.373) (0.289) (0.293) (0.292) (0.363) (0.257) (0.391) 
Economy (0-1) 2.000*** 1.501*** 1.401*** 1.348*** 1.149*** 1.780*** 0.964*** 0.265 
 (0.275) (0.251) (0.195) (0.202) (0.188) (0.171) (0.157) (0.305) 
Constant -5.122*** -4.803*** -1.094*** 0.049 -1.443*** -6.205*** -0.266 -5.277*** 
 (0.445) (0.345) (0.300) (0.321) (0.363) (0.384) (0.327) (0.451) 
N 1,071 1,294 1190 1,490 1,425 1,930 1,696 1,304 
pseudo R2 0.407 0.340 0.126 0.172 0.117 0.330 0.151 0.222 
Correctly classified 83.85% 81.30% 66.89% 74.63% 67.72% 78.65% 72.52% 74.77% 
Area under the ROC curve 0.892 0.868 0.732 0.761 0.722 0.862 0.750 0.810 
Source: 1986-1998: The European Voter Dataset. 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2012: Dutch Parliamentary Election Survey (DPES) 2002-2003, 2006, 2010 and 2012. Standard 
errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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TABLE 5. Voting for the incumbent in Norway (1985-2009) 
 1985 1989 1993 1997 2001 2005 2009 
 b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Female 0.278 0.023 0.012 -0.153 0.036 0.154 0.001 
 (0.156) (0.125) (0.122) (0.116) (0.146) (0.141) (0.156) 
Age 0.014** 0.012** 0.003 0.003 0.016*** 0.010* 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Education (0-1) 1.336*** -1.827*** -1.033*** -1.319***    
 (0.247) (0.208) (0.189) (0.192)    
Religious attendance (0-1) 3.314*** -2.223** -3.313*** -2.091*** 0.107 4.165*** -1.937* 
 (0.714) (0.719) (0.675) (0.583) (0.815) (0.765) (0.988) 
Income (0-1) 0.216 0.141 0.124 0.482** 4.377* 8.223*** -1.934 
 (0.221) (0.192) (0.155) (0.155) (1.968) (1.281) (1.194) 
Urbanization (0-1) -0.795*** 0.296* 0.540*** 0.765*** 0.496* 1.773*** -0.195 
 (0.182) (0.149) (0.149) (0.194) (0.193) (0.333) (0.164) 
Left right (0-1) 11.540*** -4.634*** -3.468*** -3.274*** -3.972*** 5.268*** -10.040*** 
 (0.578) (0.345) (0.333) (0.282) (0.369) (0.371) (0.547) 
Economy (0-1) 1.912*** 0.962*** 1.716*** 0.122 0.561 1.083** 0.654 
 (0.383) (0.222) (0.263) (0.296) (0.388) (0.339) (0.430) 
Constant -8.844*** 1.325*** 0.452 0.756* -0.897* -6.963*** 5.443*** 
 (0.525) (0.329) (0.336) (0.358) (0.404) (0.457) (0.499) 
N 1,628 1,682 1,472 1,606 1,336 1,575 1,318 
pseudo R2 0.475 0.206 0.135 0.107 0.112 0.267 0.410 
Correctly classified 86.98% 73.72% 69.23% 66.31% 77.32% 78.92% 83.76% 
Area under the ROC curve 0.921 0.802 0.744 0.722 0.747 0.850 0.901 
Source: 1985-1997: The True European Voter Dataset; 2001, 2005 and 2009: Norwegian National Election Studies (Statistics Norway). Standard errors in parentheses * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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TABLE 6. Voting for the incumbent in Sweden (1985-2006) 
 1985 1988 1991 1994 1998 2002 2006 
 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Female 0.273* 0.089 0.004 0.148 -0.224 -0.215 -0.144 
 (0.121) (0.124) (0.126) (0.152) (0.199) (0.179) (0.219) 
Age -0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.002 0.022*** 0.055 a 0.132 a 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.032) (0.074) 
Education (0-1) -1.361*** -1.360*** -0.821*** 0.742*** -0.228 -0.645* -0.765* 
 (0.168) (0.161) (0.189) (0.214) (0.289) (0.299) (0.362) 
Religious attendance (0-1) 0.335 0.628** 0.476* -1.196*** -0.130 -0.942* -0.486 
 (0.201) (0.200) (0.209) (0.256) (0.435) (0.415) (0.494) 
Social class (0-1) -1.234*** -1.540*** -2.017*** 2.357*** -2.512*** -1.074** -1.961*** 
 (0.233) (0.244) (0.276) (0.269) (0.471) (0.327) (0.474) 
Urbanization (0-1) 0.298 0.490* 0.603** -0.730** 0.296 0.292 -0.343 
 (0.199) (0.200) (0.204) (0.249) (0.329) (0.242) (0.347) 
Left right (0-1) -6.434*** -5.633*** -6.922*** 11.020*** -4.179*** -4.524*** -5.246*** 
 (0.363) (0.355) (0.399) (0.585) (0.510) (0.482) (0.567) 
Economy (0-1) 1.301*** 0.743*** 0.597** 0.603 1.607*** 0.804*** 0.671 
 (0.150) (0.180) (0.216) (0.324) (0.324) (0.228) (0.347) 
Constant 2.855*** 2.241*** 2.815*** -6.119*** -0.088 1.706*** 2.296*** 
 (0.362) (0.383) (0.382) (0.453) (0.640) (0.423) (0.544) 
N 2,102 1,861 1,902 1,819 686 759 588 
pseudo R2 0.369 0.301 0.341 0.512 0.265 0.212 0.298 
Correctly classified 80.97% 76.89% 79.60% 85.98% 76.97% 73.12% 77.55% 
Area under the ROC curve 0.884 0.851 0.876 0.934 0.834 0.805 0.852 
Source: 1985-1998: The European Voter Dataset; 2002, 2006: Swedish National Election Studies. Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. a Age 
measured in age categories. 
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APPENDIX 5. Summary of individual-level analyses – Economy coefficient  
 
Note: Economic voting coefficient (and 95%-confidence interval) on voting for an incumbent party. Estimates 
from election-specific models (see Appendix 3)
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APPENDIX 6. Controlling for clarity of responsibility (interactions) 
 
Explaining the incumbent vote share in Western Europe (since 1950)  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Incumbent vote sharee-1 0.841*** 
(0.044) 
0.841*** 
(0.044) 
GDP growth rate 1.010 
(0.519) 
0.877 
(0.521) 
Time  -0.127*** 
(0.023) 
-0.154*** 
(0.034) 
GDP growth x Time  0.008 
(0.008) 
ENEPe-1 1.577* 
(0.611) 
1.729** 
(0.637) 
GDP growth x ENEPe-1  -0.155 
(0.149) 
-0.191 
(0.154) 
# parties in government 0.481 
(0.633) 
0.489 
(0.636) 
GDP growth x # parties in 
government  
0.049 
(0.158) 
0.059 
(0.158) 
Constant 4.353 
(3.362) 
4.869 
(3.355) 
Country dummies? Yes Yes 
N elections 240 240 
N countries 14 14 
R2 0.885 0.885 
Note: OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), estimated through xtpcse in Stata. 
Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. e-1 refers to the previous election.
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APPENDIX 7. Aggregate-level analysis of the impact of GDP on incumbents’ vote share 
(only elections included in individual-level analysis) 
 
 
Explaining the incumbent vote share in Western Europe (only elections included in 
individual-level analysis) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
b 
(s.e.) 
Incumbent vote 
sharee-1 
    0.541*** 
(0.139) 
0.550*** 
(0.139) 
GDP growth rate -0.339 
(0.562) 
-1.894 
(2.137) 
0.422 
(0.407) 
0.221 
(1.163) 
0.401 
(0.355) 
1.201 
(1.250) 
Time  -0.364** 
(0.116) 
-0.434** 
(0.166) 
-0.219* 
(0.093) 
-0.228 
(0.131) 
-0.193** 
(0.073) 
-0.155 
(0.097) 
GDP growth x Time  0.036 
(0.046) 
 0.005 
(0.038) 
 -0.018 
(0.030) 
Constant 58.959*** 
(6.074) 
62.107*** 
(8.200) 
47.402*** 
(4.955) 
47.834*** 
(6.522) 
24.036*** 
(6.345) 
21.890** 
(6.975) 
Country dummies? No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N elections 46 46 46 46 46 46 
N countries 6 6 6 6 6 6 
R2 0.179 0.188 0.551 0.551 0.700 0.702 
Note: OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE), estimated through xtpcse in Stata. 
Significance levels: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. e-1 refers to the previous election.  
